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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COVE VIEW EXCAVATING &
CONSTRUCTION CO.,

]
]

Plaintiff-Respondent, !1
vs.

!
1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Civil No. 870180-CA

D. THOMAS FLYNN and D. THOMAS
FLYNN CONSTRUCTION,
Defendants-Appellants. '
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(c).

The

Defendants appeal a judgment rendered by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, acting Circuit Court Judge, sitting without a jury.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Trial Court's findings are clearly erro-

neous and should be set aside.
2.

Whether, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff's negotia-

tion of an instrument with a restrictive endorsement constitutes an Accord and Satisfaction.

-2STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. (Cove View) brought
an action in the Tenth Circuit Court against D. Thomas Flynn
and D. Thomas Flynn Construction (Flynn) for equipment services
and rent.

In defense, Flynn asserted that Cove View's claims

were fully satisfied through an Accord and Satisfaction.

The

matter came before the Court, sitting without a jury, on the
31st day of March 1987.

The Court found no accord and satis-

faction and ruled in Cove View's favor.

Flynn appeals that

judgment.
In the spring of 1984, Flynn was awarded a contract by the
Utah Department of Transportation to perform certain bridge
improvements on a public road in Sevier County, State of Utah.
T.65. Because of the amount of water that spring, Flynn determined that the backhoe being used on the project was too small.
Seeing Cove View's larger backhoe sitting near a service station, Flynn aproached Mr. Wayne Grundy, president of Cove View,
and inquired into the backhoe1s availability. T.66. Mr. Grundy
is a general contractor like Flynn and has been in the business
of heavy equipment for at least twenty (20) years. T.17.
On or about May 4, 1984, the parties orally agreed that the
backhoe would be used for a couple of days work at the rate of
$125.00 per hour.

In addition to the backhoe work, it was

subsequently agreed that Flynn would rent one pump from Cove
In addition to the backhoe work, it was subsequently agreed

-3that Flynn would rent one pump from Cove View at $35.00 per
day and that Flynn would purchase 14 sheets of plyform at
$10,00 per sheet.

T.ll.

There was no dispute that the backhoe was put to work on
May 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15, 1984.

There was also no dispute that

the pump was in operation beginning May 8, 1984 and that it
was removed from the project on June 14, 1984.

There was,

however, differing testimonies as to whether or not Cove View's
billing for the backhoe work and pump rental was excessive.
Cove View testified that its May 25 billing correctly showed
4l£ hours as the number of hours the backhoe was used.

T.10.

Over Flynn's objection, Cove View offered the records of the
Utah Department of Transportation as evidence of Cove View's
claim for the items billed.

The State Inspector testified that

that he was not one of the parties to the agreement and that he
had no knowledge as to how many hours noted on the State's
records can be attributed to Cove View's backhoe. T.51. Flynn
testified that the correct hours should have been 28, as is
reflected by Flynn's daily logs.
and 6.

T.68.

Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5,

Flynn also testified that the pump broke down and that

by June 1, 1984 Cove View was told to take the pump back.
Although it was anticipated originally that a bill would
be sent at the end of the work, Cove View billed Flynn on May
25, 1987 for the backhoe, and for the pump rent through May 25
and for 14 sheets of plyform.

Exhibit 13 (See addendum).

-4Flynn testified that because his records reflected $4,060.00
as due instead of $5,922.50 as was billed, a check was sent in
the amount of $5,000.00 as a compromise for the difference.
Flynn therefore tendered the check with the following restrictive endorsement "Payment in full for all labor and materials
to 6-26-84."

T.82.

(See addendum) In

the meantime, Cove View

sent its second billing for pump rental from May 25 to June 14,
1984 and for costs to replace the seal in the pump. Exhibit 14.
(See addendum)

Upon receiving Flynn's check, Cove View sought

advise from counsel and cashed the check after crossing through
the restrictive endorsement.

There was conflicting testimony

as to whether the parties discussed Flynn's disagreement over
the billing prior to sending the $5,000.00 check.

T.31,96.

Cove View subsequently brought the action below to collect
what it felt was left owing.

After hearing the evidence, the

Court found that "just sending a check marked 'paid in full1,
without there being an indicated dispute by either party, is
not fair, nor proper..."

T.118.

The Court also found that a

restrictive endorsement on a check for services has no effect
and is "unfair " in being sent.

T.119.

The Court found that

Flynn's payment was for an ongoing account and that there was
not a meeting of the minds for settlement.

Therefore, it

ruled that there was no Accord and Satisfaction.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Courts findings were induced by an erroneous view

of the law and were not supported by the evidence. As a result,
the Courts findings are in error and should be set aside.

-52.

When a check is tendered as payment in full of an un-

liquidated claim, Cove View cannot disregard the condition
attached to the check.

It had the choice of accepting the

check on Flynn's terms or of returning the check.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURTS FINDINGS ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
Rule 52(a) provides for the Trial Courts factual findings
to be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous.

In the

present case, the Trial Courts findings that led to the conclusion that the restrictive endorsement had no effect are
clearly erroneous for the following reasons and should be set
aside by this Court.
1.

The evidence does not support the findings.

Although

some of the basic terms of the parties agreement were not in
dispute there was a dispute as to whether the hours billed by
Cove View were excessive.

The testimonies of Mr. Grundy, Mr.

Flynn, and the State Inspector each led to a different conclusion as to what hours should have been billed.

The Courts

reliance on the State Inspector's testimony is particularly
curious in light of the fact that the inspector testified that
from his records he could not tell how many hours could be attributed to Cove View's backhoe.
There were conflicting testimonies as to whether there
were discussions between the parties concerning Flynn's

-6disagreement over the hours billed.

Even if the Court believed

Mr. Grundy's testimony that he was not made aware of a dispute
on his billing prior to receiving the check, it cannot be concluded that there was not a bonafide dispute.

The fact that

the dispute over the hours billed was not expressed to Cove
View prior to receiving the check does not negate the fact that
the hours billed did not agree with Flynn's record of Cove View's
hours on the job.

Furthermore, the restrictive endorsement

itself led to the conclusion that a dispute existed.
The Court's conclusion that the payment represented a progress payment also is not supported by the evidence.
parties had contracted for this project only.

The

The backhoe

work was completed by May 15 and the pump was removed from the
property on June 14. It was the parties understanding that the
bill would be sent at the end of the project, which originally
was anticipated to conclude before the end of the month of May.
Cove View's election to invoice at the end of the month does not
have the effect of making Flynn's payment a progress payment.
Such an effect jeopardizes what the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized as a convenient and valuable means of achieving informal settlements as Flynn sought to do here.
modeling, infra.

See Marton Re-

All a creditor would have to do to defeat

the defense of Accord and Satisfaction, is to send an invoice
each month to each debtor, thereby causing every payment sent
"in full satisfaction" to be construed as a progress payment.

-7In addition, the restrictive endorsement clearly set forth the
condition that the cashing of the check would be full satisfaction for all labor and materials rendered through 6-26-84,
well after all work and materials were completed and taken
from the project.
2. Records of the State Inspector were improperly admitted
over Flynnfs objection. Rule 602 of the Rules of Evidence state
that a witness may not testify to a matter unless there is
evidence that he has personal knowledge of the matter.

In

the present case, the testimony of the State Inspector
was offered to prove the correctness of Cove View's billing.
The State Inspector testified that he was not a party to the
contract and did not know what portion of his records reflected
Cove View's backhoe.

Because the inspector did not have per-

sonal knowledge as to the contract or as to what his records
represented, the Records of the Utah Department of Transportation
should not have been admitted into evidence to prove Cove View
claimed performance and the Court's reliance thereon should be
set aside.
3.
law.

The findings were based on an erroneous view of the

The Court stated its view several times that to just send

a check, without indicating a dispute prior to sending it, as
it obviously felt Flynn had done, was improper and unfair.
This view is contrary to the view expressed in Marton Remodeling
v. Jensen 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985).

In Marton Remodeling, the

-8Court recognized the importance of a "payment in full" check
as a convenient and valuable means of achieving informal settlements.

In reviewing the law, the Court quoted the following

illustration:
"A contracts with B to have repairs made on A's
house, no price being fixed, B sends A a bill for
$1,000.00. A honestly disputes this amount and sends
a letter explaining that he thinks the amount excessive and is enclosing a check for $800.00 as payment
in full. B, after reading the letter, endorses the
check and deposits it in his bank for collection. B
is bound by an Accord under which he promises to
accept payment of the check in satisfaction of A's
debt for repairs. The result is the same if, before
endorsing the check, B adds the words "Accepted under
protest as part of payment". The result would be different, however, if B's claim were liquidated, undisputed, and matured."
The present case is similar to the illustration just quoted.
Instead of sending the check with a letter explaining the check
as payment in full, Flynn sent a check which clearly explained
itself as payment in full.

The law does not regard such a

procedure as improper and unfair.
Furthermore, the Court in Marton Remodeling recognized
that a "time and materials" contract of that class of transaction's gives rise to an "unliquidated claim".

See 6 Corbin,

Contracts §1787 (1962). The Court erred in finding that a check
like Flynn's as payment for services was unfair.

The Courts

erroneous view of the law induced its findings that the restrictive endorsement had no effect.

-9II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE CASHING OF THE
CHECK CONSTITUTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
In Marton Remodeling, supra, the Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the common law rule on negotiating checks with
restrictive endorsements . When a bonafide dispute arises
and a check is tendered as full payment of a liquidated claim,
the creditor may not disregard the condition attached.

He

either cashes the check accepting the condition, or he returns
the check, See also 6 Corbin, Contracts (1962) §1277, 1279; 15
Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. 1972) §1854; and 2 Restatement
(Second) contracts (1981) §281, Comment d.

The Court noted

that an Accord and Satisfaction is not automatic every time a
check is cashed while bearing the notatation "paid in full".
There needs to be an unliquidated claim or a bonafide dispute
over the amount due.

In addition, payment must be tendered in

full settlement of the entire dispute and cannot be given merely
as a progress payment.
For the reasons argued above, there was a bonafide dispute
over the number of hours owed.
amount.

The contract was not a fixed

Rather, it was for equipment and services at the rate

of $125.00.

Flynn disagreed with the number of hours billed

and sent a check for a payment which he felt was a compromise.
The check was noted as "payment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84."

There was no question but that Flynn in-

tended the account with Cove View to have been paid in full.

-10Even if Cove View's contention that there was no discussion
of dispute in accepted, the dispute became apparent once they
received Flynn's check.
in any way.

Cove View was not taken advantage of

Its President, Mr. Grundy, had been in this type

of business for twenty (20) years and knew, or should have
known, of this as an informal way to resolve a dispute which
Flynn had with the billing.

The check was sent after all work

had been completed and all equipment removed from the project.
The fact that the payment crossed in the mail with the second
billing does not indicate the payment as a progress payment.
Calculating the billing to be excessive, Flynn sent a check
for an amount he felt would resolve all claims arising out of
the relationship between the parties.
Since there was a bonafide dispute, since payment was tendered as payment in full for the entire contract, and since
payment was not given merely as a progress payment, Cove View's
cashing of the $5,000^00 check constituted an Accord and
Satisfaction as a matter of law.

It was Cove View's crossing

through of Flynn's restrictive endorsement that, as a matter of
law, had no effect. Cove View had the option to accept the check
upon the condition noted thereon or of returning it to Flynn.
Cove View cashed the check, thereby accepting it as payment
in full for the obligations incurred by Flynn on the Serier
County Project.

-11-

CONCLUSION
The findings of the Court must be set aside and the judgment reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of July, 1987.

ANDERSON AND DUNN

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid on this
day of July, 1987 to

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, on this
^ipfdy

day of July, 1987 to Marcus Taylor, Labrum & Jaylor,

108 North Main Street, P.O. Box 72y4> Richfield, U^a/h 84701.
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MARTON REMODELING v. JENSEN

Utah 607

Cite a* 706 ?2d 607 (Utah 1985)

subsection (g)(7), "the prosecution shall
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument." Here,
the prosecutor initially made a very brief
statement of the case in his closing argument and reserved most of his time for
rebuttal. Although this tactic may not
have been what the defendant expected, it
was not improper. As to closing arguments, Rule 17 merely requires that the
prosecution open closing argument and limit rebuttal to only those matters argued by
the defense. We find no error here.
We have reviewed defendant's other
claims of error and find them to be without
merit.
Affirmed.

for remodeling. Jury awarded $1,538 actual damages, $1,000 punitive damages, and
$5,950.24 attorney fees. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., remitted award of punitive damages and reduced award of attorney fees to
$2,976.12, and both parties appealed. The
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that builder's cashing of $5,000 check containing condition that "[endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction," where
bona fide dispute existed as to the amount
owing, constituted an "accord and satisfaction" that could not be altered by builder's
addition of "not full payment" below condition.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., dissented.

HALL, C.J., DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

(O

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Mark JENSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Mark JENSEN, Defendant and
Respondent

1. Accord and Satisfaction ®=>11(2)
Builder's cashing of $5,000 check, containing condition that "[endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction,"
where valid dispute existed as to amount
owing, constituted "accord and satisfaction" that could not be altered by builder's
addition of "not full payment" below the
condition.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Accord and Satisfaction <3=*11(1)
Accord and satisfaction of single claim
is not avoided merely because amount paid
and accepted is only that which debtor concedes to be due or that debtor's view of
controversy is adopted in making settlement.

Sept 17, 1985.

3. Accord and Satisfaction <s=ll(2)
Where bona fide dispute arose as to
amount owing and check was tendered by
owner to builder in full payment of unliquidated claim, the builder could not disregard
the condition attached to check.

Builder sued to foreclose on mechanic's lien on owner's house and lot for
$6,538.12 which builder claimed was due

4. Accord and Satisfaction <s=>l
Common-law rules of accord and satisfaction are not altered by U.C.A.1953, 70A1-207.

Nos. 18400, 18401.
Supreme Court of Utah.

608
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B. Ray Zoll, Salt Lake City, for Marton.
Peter M. Ennenga, Midvale, for Jensen.

accord and satisfaction that could not be
altered by the words added to the condition
placed thereon by Jensen. We agree.

HOWE, Justice:
These appeals are from a judgment entered in an action brought by the plaintiff,
Marton Remodeling, to foreclose a mechanic's lien which it had filed against a house
and lot owned by the defendant, Mark Jensen, for $6,538.12 which it claimed was due
it for remodeling. Judgment was entered
on a jury verdict for $1,538, together with
$1,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees
of $5,950.24. The trial court remitted the
award of punitive damages and reduced the
attorney fees by 50 percent to $2,976.12.
Jensen appeals from that judgment in case
No. 18400, and in case No. 18401, Marton
appeals, seeking to reinstate the award of
punitive damages and recover the full
amount of attorney fees awarded by the
jury.
Jensen engaged Marton Remodeling in a
"time and materials" contract to remodel
his house. When Marton presented the
final bill for $6,538.12, Jensen contended
that the number of hours claimed was excessive. He offered to pay $5,000 because
he considered the services were worth that
amount, but Marton refused the offer.
Nevertheless, Jensen sent Marton a $5,000
check with the following condition placed
thereon: "Endorsement hereof constitutes
full and final satisfaction of any and all
claims payee may have against Mark S.
Jensen, or his property, arising from any
circumstances existing on the date hereof."
Marton wrote a letter to Jensen refusing to
accept the check in full payment and demanded the balance. When Jensen made
no further payment, Marton filed a mechanic's lien on Jensen's property and
cashed the check after writing "not full
payment" below the condition. This action
was then brought by Marton to recover the
$1,538 balance plus punitive damages and
attorney fees.

Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Marton Remodeling, there was
an accord and satisfaction as we have defined that term in the previous cases decided by this Court. See Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610 P.2d
1369 (1980); Tates, Inc. v. Little America
Refining Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975);
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc.,
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Ralph
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building &
Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669
(1938); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39
P.2d 1073 (1935).

[1] Jensen contends that the trial court
erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his
favor because, as a matter of law, Marton's
cashing of the $5,000 check constituted an

Marton asserts that there was not an
accord and satisfaction because Marton
was unquestionably entitled to the $5,000
represented by the check, and the only
dispute was whether any further amount
was owing. He cites Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra, in support
of that reasoning. That reliance is misplaced because that case did not involve a
single claim as in the instant case. In
Bennett, a salesman who was paid only
commissions on sales made by him was put
on a fixed monthly salary by his employer.
When he terminated his employment two
months later, he demanded payment of his
fixed monthly salary then due him plus
unpaid commissions on sales allegedly
made by him prior to the change. He also
sought reimbursement of stock payments.
His employer gave him a check for the
amount of the fixed monthly salary then
due him, which he cashed, bearing the
statement that it was "payment in full of
the account stated below—endorsement of
check by payee is sufficient receipt." This
Court viewed the salesman as having two
claims: one for his fixed monthly salary
which was not in dispute and another claim
for his commissions about which there was
a dispute. The amount of the check covered only the fixed monthly salary and did
not purport to relate to the claim for commissions. We held that the plaintiffs cash-

MARTON REMODELING v. JENSEN
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mg of the check in those circumstances
[3] It is of no legal consequence that
could not constitute an accord and satisfac- Marton told Jensen upon receipt of the
tion of the claim for commissions. We $5,000 check that he did not regard it as
cited Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., payment in full. Marton could not dis13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), which regard with immunity the condition placed
also involved two claims, in support of our on the check by Jensen by writing "not full
decision. The Alaska Supreme Court in payment" under the condition. It is true
Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, Alaska, 673 that there is not an automatic accord and
P.2d 774 (1983), held that a single claim, satisfaction every time a creditor cashes a
including both its disputed and undisputed check bearing a "paid in full" notation.
elements, is unitary and not subject to divi- ^Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 P.
sion so long as the whole claim is unliqui- 412 (1912). An accord and satisfaction requires that there be an unliquidated claim
dated.
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due.
Marton is not aided by Allen-Howe Spe- Ashton v. Skeen, supra. Payment must
cialties v. U.S. Construction, Inc., Utah, be tendered in full settlement of the entire
611 P.2d 705 (1980). There, the cashing of dispute and not in satisfaction of a sepaa check representing a progress payment rate undisputed obligation, as in Bennett v.
on a contract was held not to be an accord Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra.
and satisfaction of all amounts owing up to Payment cannot be given merely as a
that time. At the time the progress pay- progress payment, as in Allen-Howe v.
ment was made, there was no dispute and, U.S. Construction, Inc., supra. However,
unlike the instant case, it was not tendered when a bona fide dispute arises (the existas the last payment of the contract where ence of which Marton does not dispute in
finality and settlement is usually sought this appeal) and a check is tendered in full
and intended.
payment of an unliquidated claim as we
have here, arising out of a "time and mate[2] Thus, neither of those cases is dis- rials" contract, the creditor may not dispositive here where we are confronted with regard the condition attached. Corbin on
a single unliquidated claim, viz., the bal- Contracts § 1279 explains:
ance owing on a "time and materials ,, conThe fact that the creditor scratches out
tract Instead, the general rule applies,
the words "in full payment," or other
which is that an accord and satisfaction of
similar words indicating that the paya single claim is not avoided merely bement is tendered in full satisfaction, does
cause'the amount paid^and accepted is only
not prevent his retention of the money
that which the debtor concedes to be due or
from operating as an assent to the disthat his j i e w of the controversy is adopted
charge. The creditor's action in such
in making_the settlement. Air Van Lines,
case is quite inconsistent with his words.
Inc. v. Buster, supra; North American
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not
Union v. Montenie, 68 Colo. 220, 189 P. 16
in fact assent to the offer made by the
debtor, so that there is no actual "meet(1920); Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co. v.
ing* of the minds." But this is merely
Southern Colorado Mercantile Co., 65
another illustration of the fact that the
Colo. 587, 178 P. 577, 4 A.L.R. 471 (1919); 1
making of a contract frequently does not
CJ.S. Accord and Satisfaction
§ 32
require such an actual meeting.
(1936). Corbin on Contracts § 1289 approves the rule and states that it is sup- (Footnote omitted.) Restatement (Second)
ported by the greater number of cases, of Contracts § 281 is to the same effect
citing as good examples Miller v. Prince and provides the following illustration:
6. A contracts with B to have repairs
Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d
made on A's house, no price being fixed.
663 (1937), Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66
B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly
N.W. 834 (1896), and Fuller v. Kemp, 138
disputes this amount and sends a letter
N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 1034 (1893).
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explaining that he thinks the amount excessive and is enclosing a check for $800
as payment in full. B, after reading the
letter, indorses the check and deposits it
in his bank for collection. B is bound by
an accord under which he promises to
accept payment of the check in satisfaction of A's debt for repairs. The result
is the same if, before indorsing the
check, B adds the words ''Accepted under protest as part payment." The result would be different, however, if B's
claim were liquidated, undisputed and
matured.
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v.
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973),
for cases where it was held that a creditor
cannot avoid the consequences of his exercise of dominion by a declaration that he
does not assent to the condition attached
by the debtor. The last cited case succinctly stated the law to be, "The law gave the
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check
on defendant's terms or of returning it."
[4] Marton contends that under U.C.A,,
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition
placed on the check by Jensen when it
added the words "not full payment." Marton asserts that those were words of reservation of rights recognized by section 70A1-207. Without deciding whether the
wording added by Marton could be so interpreted, no authority is cited by Marton that
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full payment" check. Of the authorities which we
have found, the better reasoned hold that
our section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code) does not alter the common law rules
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau
Products Corp, v. Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d
655 (1984); R.A. Reither
Construction,
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Association, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984);
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydraulic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, supra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon,
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364,

664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut Printers,
Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d
54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550
F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v.
Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark.
App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v.
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App.,
407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v.
Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 NJ.Super.
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coastal Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261
S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App.
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and Jahn v.
Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted
with approval in Recent Developments in
Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710);
Rosenthal, Discord and
Dissatisfaction:
Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)).
Several courts have stated that if they
were to construe the statute to limit accord
and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a convenient and valuable means of achieving
informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire
Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch,
Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in
order to limit litigation. Accord and satisfaction serves this goal. Air Van Lines,
Inc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge
Corbm in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide
that a creditor can reserve his rights on a
'payment in full' check, it would seriously
circumvent what has been universally accepted in the business community as a convenient means for the resolution of disagreements."
Our determination that there was an accord and satisfaction obviates the necessity
of our consideration of any of the other
points raised in either appeal. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.

